Investigating Moore’s Paradox
Uploaded by lancej13 on Oct 26, 2011
This paper discusses two aspects of Moore’s Paradox: what statements give rise to it, and why one can’t make such statements. (10 pages; 2 sources; APA citation style)
I Introduction
Moore’s Paradox is more than an interesting philosophical problem; it also must be looked at semantically to determine the relationship of the clauses in the sentence or sentences under consideration. When one clause is dependent upon and derives it meaning from another, then both must make sense when spoken together; the common idea they share must also make sense.
This paper considers two aspects of Moore’s Paradox: What sort of statement gives rise to it? And why can’t one say such a thing? It also explores the Paradox in general and tries to come to terms with the concept implied in it.
II Statements Giving Rise to the Paradox
In the simplest terms, Moore’s Paradox describes those statements that inherently give rise to a contradiction. The example usually used is, “It’s raining but I don’t believe it’s raining,” also expressed as “p but I don’t believe p.” Several questions immediately come to mind, and we’ll see if we can find satisfactory answers for them
The first is “Why don’t you/I/the speaker believe what they are currently experiencing?” The next is, are there circumstances under which “p but I don’t believe p” can be true? And finally, are there times in which the two halves of the sentence make sense individually but not as a whole, and vice versa?
As I’ve read about this topic, it’s become apparent that much of our thinking about Moore’s Paradox is based largely on the way in which the sentences under discussion are linguistically constructed. There is a significant difference between asserting, “p but I didn’t believe p” and “p but I won’t believe p.” In the first, with both clauses in the past, the statement becomes illogical: if p has already happened, and has been seen to have occurred, then it’s impossible to assert not-p, because it took place. But if p is still in the future, then it’s possible to understand how we might say, yes, I believe p will occur, but I don’t think I will believe it, even if it does. (“I know someone will win the lottery next week, but even if I do, I won’t believe it.”)
We’re not actually...