Leibiz On Innate Ideas
Leibiz On Innate Ideas
Rationalists argued from “self-evident” basic principles and definitions, with Leibniz, in particular, using his principle of sufficient reason as a way to deduce knowledge. Arguing from such principles and definitions, the rationalists held, could lead to certain knowledge through deductive proof, since if an argument’s premises are true, it is guaranteed its conclusion be true. This is the only way to acquire knowledge since knowledge must be absolutely certain; else, it is not knowledge at all. Thus, Descartes maintained that if you can in any way doubt what you think you know, you do not actually know it. In sum, anything that can be known should be (and needs to be) provable as deduced by certain original truths (premises).
It is by understanding these basic tenets of rationalism that we shall come to understand why Leibniz argues ideas are innate within persons.
Self-evident truths must be, by necessity, innate to the mind—existing as soon as the mind exists. Without these basic ideas, argues the rationalist, humans could not experience the most ordinary experiences.
But we should not suppose, insists the rationalist, we are always conscious of these innate ideas. An experiential trigger may be needed to activate them.
And so the rationalist insists, contrary to the empiricist who claims all our ideas derive from experience, some ideas must exist before perception can take place. Indeed, we need these ideas for perception (CHECK!!).
While the rationalist may be correct on their own terms in regard to innate ideas, lets turn to the overwhelming body of opinion that takes a (sometimes much) different spin on such talk.
As Hume—an empiricist—articulated in his Theory of Ideas:
We may observe, that in order to prove the ideas of extension and colour not to be innate, philosophers do noting but shew [sic], that they are conveyed by our senses. To prove the ideas of passion and desire not to be innate, they observe that we have a preceding experience of these emotions ourselves. Now if we carefully examine these arguments, we shall find that they prove nothing but that ideas are preceded by other more lively perceptions, from which they are derived, and which they represent (Broadie, 67).
What does modern psychology say about innate ideas?
[i:94814eafe6]Works Cited
Broadie, Alexander, Ed. The Scottish Enlightenment: An Anthology. Edinburgh. Canongate Books, 1997.[/i:94814eafe6]